Position Notes

Verified against: spec docs/PRD.md §6.11, §19.4 · docs/work/interface-v7.md §C · contracts/nectar-core/src/notes.rs (WO-22, merged 2026-11-10) · F-337 (near-contract-standards 5.30.1, 2026-11-10) · D-023 (2026-11-10) · tests listed below · testnet: docs/EVIDENCE.md §G2b (2026-11-10T16:34Z first run, views), §G14 (2026-11-10T16:52Z) · transfer and release paths read 2026-11-11: contracts/nectar-core/src/notes.rs:332-349 (move_note), lib.rs:824-858 (on_repay), remote.rs:957 (request_remote_release) · web app receiver check: F-380, F-381, F-382 (2026-11-11), FACTS C-020, D-029 (2026-11-11)

Status: live on testnet (EVIDENCE §G2b: nft_tokens lists q-0, p-0, q-1, p-1 and nft_token_svg p-1 renders; EVIDENCE §G14: nft_mint p-4). Reserve Note r-NVDAx-0 was minted in the 2026-11-10 module run (evidence/v7-modules/summary.md). Transfer locks are tested in the sandbox only. The earlier v1 contract mints no Notes.

Three kinds of Note

nectar-core implements NEP-171 (core), NEP-177 (metadata) and NEP-181 (enumeration) itself. Collection name "Nectar Position Notes", symbol NOTE. The types and event shapes are copied from near-contract-standards 5.30.1 (F-337). The crate is not linked because every transfer path needs Nectar's own locks (D-023).

Token id	Minted when	Represents
q-<quote_id>	a quote is funded (FundPappusQuote)	a buyer's escrowed quote and its fees
p-<position_id>	a NEAR position opens, or a remote position is funded	a loan and its collateral
r-<collateral>-<n>	a deposit into the Nectar Reserve	Reserve shares, units and fees

The contract pays mint storage (NEP-145 storage deposits are PROD-only). There are no approvals (NEP-178): only the owner transfers.

Authority follows the Note

The Note owner is the record's owner (Quote.buyer, Position.borrower, Reserve Note owner), and a transfer rewrites it. Every authority check therefore moves with the Note: top-up, withdrawal initiate and complete, claim_fees, self_settle, Reserve exit. For collateral held on NEAR, every payout goes to the current owner as well: residual collateral on full repay (lib.rs:852-858), the settlement remainder and the self-settlement remainder. The previous owner loses access at once.

Two exceptions:

• Remote Loan Notes (Solana devnet, Base local fork) do not carry the collateral. A transfer moves the borrower's authority (move_note sets position.borrower) and anyone may repay (on_repay), but request_remote_release signs the release to the depositor recorded at deposit, and the vault pays only that depositor (withdraw). The remote settlement remainder also goes to the depositor. A new owner who repays a remote loan does not receive the collateral. This is a known limitation (SECURITY.md "What remains" item 12).
• The original funder stays in the quote_funded and position_opened events. History is not rewritten.

Transferring a Quote Note clears its Solana recipient (buyer_remote_recipient). The new owner sets one with set_quote_remote_recipient(quote_id, recipient?).

Locks

nft_transfer is refused with note_locked: pending settlement while a settlement references the Note:

• Loan Note: the position is Settling, has a signed but unrelayed Solana leg, or is Releasing.
• Quote Note: a pending settlement selected the quote (OutLayer candidates at start_quoter, or the quote of a remote leg).
• Reserve Note: a settlement that reached, or may reach, the Reserve of that asset is pending.

A recipient therefore cannot change between the start of a settlement and its payouts. set_quote_remote_recipient is refused while the Quote Note is locked. nft_transfer_locked(token_id) lets a client grey out the button before a wallet opens.

Calls, views and events

• Calls (1 yoctoNEAR): nft_transfer(receiver_id, token_id, approval_id?, memo?), nft_transfer_call(.., msg). approval_id is ignored; transfer to self is refused; memo and msg lengths are bounded. The contract does not check whether the receiver exists.
• Web app Transfer (R2-09): a named receiver must answer view_account; an UNKNOWN_ACCOUNT answer (F-380) or an RPC failure keeps Transfer off. Only 64-hex and 0x + 40-hex ids count as implicit and skip the lookup (F-381). 0s and 0u ids are looked up too (F-382), so the web app cannot send a Note to such an account before it exists. That is the safe side of FACTS C-020, kept by decision (D-029).
• Views: nft_token, nft_tokens, nft_tokens_for_owner, nft_supply_for_owner, nft_total_supply, nft_metadata, nft_transfer_locked. Pages are capped at 20.
• nft_token carries a live SVG card as data:image/svg+xml;base64,…; nft_token_svg(token_id) returns the raw SVG. Only numbers and fixed words enter it, and the asset symbol and contract id are XML-escaped.
• Events: NEP-297 standard nep171 nft_mint / nft_transfer; nectar quote_remote_recipient_set / quote_remote_recipient_cleared.

The Feed MCP tool get_note still returns not_available; it is wired once the v2 contract is deployed (Agent skill and x402).

Tests

• ids, encoding and media: tests_notes::v7_notes_ids_parse_canonical_only, v7_notes_base64_rfc4648_vectors, v7_notes_xml_escape_and_number_formats, v7_notes_template_is_small_and_has_every_placeholder, v7_notes_metadata_and_token_media
• minting and enumeration: v7_notes_minted_on_funding_and_open_with_nep171_events, v7_notes_enumeration_pages_and_owner_lists_after_transfers, v7_notes_page_cap
• authority: v7_notes_quote_authority_moves_with_transfer, v7_notes_old_quote_owner_refused, v7_notes_claim_fees_follows_note, v7_notes_residual_collateral_goes_to_loan_note_owner, v7_notes_self_settle_by_new_loan_owner
• remote recipient: v7_notes_transfer_clears_remote_recipient_and_new_owner_sets_one, v7_notes_set_recipient_owner_only, v7_notes_set_recipient_refused_while_locked
• locks: v7_notes_locked_while_quoter_settling_then_free_after_cancel, v7_notes_loan_transfer_refused_while_settling, v7_notes_candidate_quote_transfer_refused_while_settling, v7_notes_remote_leg_locks_quote_and_loan_until_relayed, v7_notes_remote_sign_failure_unlocks, v7_notes_releasing_locks_loan
• transfer rules: v7_notes_transfer_needs_one_yocto, v7_notes_transfer_owner_only, v7_notes_transfer_to_self_refused, v7_notes_transfer_memo_bounded, v7_notes_transfer_call_schedules_receiver_and_resolve, v7_notes_transfer_call_gas_floor
• Reserve Notes: tests_reserve::v7_reserve_note_transfer_moves_the_claim, v7_reserve_note_transfer_refused_while_reserve_settlement_pending; sandbox reserve_shortfall_stays_settling_and_locks_transfers (contracts/nectar-core/tests/sandbox_reserve.rs)